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Abstract
Experts are asked to provide their advice in a situation of uncertainty. They adopt the decision maker’s
utility function, but each has a potentially different set of prior probabilities, and so does the decision
maker. The decision maker and the experts maximize the minimal expected utility with respect to their sets
of priors. We show that a natural Pareto condition is equivalent to the existence of a set Λ of probability
vectors over the experts, interpreted as possible allocations of weights to the experts, such that (i) the
decision maker’s set of priors is precisely all the weighted-averages of priors, where an expert’s prior is
taken from her set and the weight vector is taken from Λ; (ii) the decision maker’s valuation of an act is the
minimal weighted valuation, over all weight vectors in Λ, of the experts’ valuations.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The problem
A decision maker is offered a partnership in a business venture. The offer appears very attrac-
tive, but, after she talks to some friends, it’s pointed out to her that the project will be a serious
failure if the globe becomes warmer by 3–4 degrees Celsius. She decides to study the matter
and to find out what, according to the experts, is the probability of such a warming taking place
within, say, the next ten years.
It turns out that different experts have different opinions. Indeed, the phenomenon of global
warming that we presumably witness today is not similar enough to anything that we have ob-
served in the past. The cycles of the globe’s temperature take a very long time, and the conditions
that prevailed in past warmings differ significantly from those in the present. Thus, one cannot
resort to simple empirical frequencies in order to assess probabilities. More sophisticated econo-
metric techniques should be invoked to come up with such assessments, but they tend to depend
on assumptions that are not shared by all. In short, the experts do not agree, and we cannot as-
sume that the event in question has an “objective” probability. What should the decision maker
do? What is a rational way of aggregating the opinions of the experts?
1.2. The Bayesian case
Consider first the benchmark case in which all experts are Bayesian. Specifically, let pi be the
subjective probability of the event according to expert i = 1, . . . , n. It seems very natural to take
the arithmetic average of the assessments of the experts. This approach may be a little too simple
because it treats all experts equally. More generally, we may consider a weighted average of the
experts’ opinions. For every vector of non-negative weights λ = (λi)i summing up to 1, we may
define
p0 = pλ0 =
n∑
i=1
λipi. (1)
Moreover, in a more general case where pi are probability vectors, distributions on the real line,
or general probability measures, their weighted average pλ0 is well defined, and suggests itself
as a natural candidate for the decision maker’s beliefs. This rule for aggregation of probabilistic
assessments has been dubbed linear opinion pool by Stone [37], and is attributed to Laplace (see
[2,29,16], for a survey).
We will henceforth interpret p0,p1, . . . , pn as probability measures on a state space, and refer
to
p0(A) = pλ0 (A) =
n∑
i=1
λipi(A)
when we discuss the probability of a specific event A.
The weight λi can be viewed as the degree of confidence the decision maker has in expert i.
Another interpretation is the following: suppose that there exists an “objective” uncertainty about
the state that will obtain, and the “true” probability is known to be one of p1, . . . , pn. The deci-
sion maker knows this structure, but does not know which of p1, . . . , pn is the actual probability,
or the “real” data generating process. If the decision maker has Bayesian beliefs over the ob-
jective probability, given by the weights λ = (λi)i , then p0 is her derived subjective probability
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over the state space. Thus, we can think of the decision maker as if she believed that one expert is
guaranteed to generate the “correct” probability, and attaching the probability λi to the event that
expert i has access to “the truth”. We will refer to this interpretation as “the truth metaphor”.1
The averaging of probabilities resembles the averaging of utilities in social choice theory.
Correspondingly, such an averaging can be derived from a Pareto, or a unanimity condition à la
Harsanyi [24]. Specifically, the decision maker’s probability p0 is of the form (1) if and only if
the following holds: for every two choices a and b, and every utility function u, if all experts
agree that the expected utility (u) of a is at least as high as that of b, so should the decision
maker.2
1.3. Uncertainty with Bayesian experts
In terms of elegance and internal coherence, the Bayesian paradigm is hardly matched by any
other approach to modeling uncertainty. Moreover, it relies on powerful axiomatic foundations
laid by Ramsey [32], de Finetti [9,10], and Savage [33]. Yet, it has been criticized on descriptive
and normative grounds alike. Following the seminal contributions of Knight [27], Ellsberg [11],
and Schmeidler [34,35], there is a growing body of literature dealing with more general models
representing uncertainty.3 Importantly, many authors view these models as not necessarily less
rational than the Bayesian benchmark. In particular, since the Bayesian approach calls for the
formulation of subjective beliefs, it has been argued that the very fact that these beliefs differ
across individuals might indicate that it is perhaps not rational to insist on one of them.4 In our
context, the decision maker may ask herself, “If the experts fail to agree on the probability, how
can I be so sure that there is one probability that is ‘correct’? Maybe it’s safer to allow for a set
of possible probabilities, rather than pick only one?”
In this paper we focus on the maxmin expected utility (“MEU”) model, suggested by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (GS [23]), which is arguably the simplest multiple prior model that defines a
complete ordering over alternatives.5 Given a set of probabilities C, each possible act f is eval-
uated by
J (f ) = min
p∈C EUp(f )
where EUp(f ) is the expected utility of act f according to the probability p. Uncertainty aver-
sion is built into this decision rule by the min operator, evaluating each act by its worst-case
expected utility (over p ∈ C).
Applied to our context, the decision maker may, for example, be very cautious and consider
as the set C all the probability assessments of the experts, or, equivalently, their convex hull.
1 We find this interpretation useful, but it should be stressed that our model does not capture notions such as “truth” or
“objectivity”.
2 Such derivations are restricted to the case in which all experts share the same utility function, and they require some
richness conditions. Hylland and Zeckhauser [25], Mongin [30], Blackorby, Donaldson and Mongin [4], Chambers and
Hayashi [8] and Zuber [39] provided impossibility results for the simultaneous aggregation of utilities and probabilities.
Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler [22] restricted unanimity to choices over which there are no differences of belief, and
derived condition (1) under certain assumptions. However, Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud [13] showed that in the presence
of uncertainty aggregation of preferences is impossible even if the agents have the same beliefs.
3 See Gilboa [17] and Gilboa and Marinacci [18] for surveys of axiomatic foundations of the Bayesian approach, their
critiques, and alternative models.
4 See [19–21].
5 Sets of probabilities that are used to define incomplete preferences were studied by Bewley [3].
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This may be a little extreme, however. If, for example, nine experts evaluate P(A) at 0.4 and
one at 0.1, the range of probabilities for the event A will be [0.1,0.4]. Clearly, the same in-
terval would result from nine experts providing the assessment P(A) = 0.1 and only one the
assessment 0.4. Consequently, the decision maker may adopt a set of probabilities that is strictly
smaller than the entire convex hull of the experts’ beliefs. For instance, the decision maker may
consider
C =
{
p =
n∑
i=1
λipi
∣∣∣ (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Λ
}
where Λ ⊂ ({1, . . . , n}) is a set of weight vectors over the n experts. If Λ is a singleton,
Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn), the decision maker’s behavior will be Bayesian, with the probability given
by (1). If, by contrast, Λ = ({1, . . . , n}), so that the decision maker allows for any possible
vector of weights on the experts’ opinions, the decision maker will behave according to the
MEU model, with extreme uncertainty aversion as discussed above. In between these extremes,
a non-singleton, proper subset Λ of ({1, . . . , n}) allows the decision maker to (i) assign dif-
ferent weights to different experts; (ii) take into account how many experts provided a certain
assessment; and (iii) leave room for a healthy degree of doubt.
1.4. Uncertainty averse experts
If, however, we accept the possibility that rationality, or at least scientific caution, may favor
a set of probabilities over a single one, then we should also allow the experts to provide their
assessments by sets of, rather than by single probabilities. Indeed, if the experts use standard
statistical techniques, they may come up with confidence sets that cannot be shrunk to singletons
without compromising the notion of “confidence”. Thus we re-phrase the question and ask, how
can beliefs be aggregated, where “beliefs” are modeled by sets of probabilities?
The procedure suggested above consisted in representing beliefs by a class of weighted av-
erages of experts’ beliefs, with varying weight vectors. It has a natural extension to the case of
non-Bayesian experts: let Λ ⊂ ({1, . . . , n}) be a set of weight vectors over the experts. Assume
that each expert has beliefs that are modeled as a set of probabilities Ci . Then, let the decision
maker entertain the beliefs given by the set
C0 =
{
p =
n∑
i=1
λipi
∣∣∣ λ ∈ Λ, pi ∈ Ci
}
. (2)
Assume that the decision maker uses this set in the context of the maxmin expected utility
model. As in the case in which Ci are singletons, this formula allows the decision maker a wide
range of attitudes towards the experts’ opinions. If Λ is a singleton, the decision maker does not
add any uncertainty aversion of her own: she takes a fixed average of all probabilities the experts
deem possible, and the freedom of choosing a probability in C0 is entirely due to the fact that
the experts fail to commit to a single probability measure. By contrast, if Λ is the entire simplex
({1, . . . , n}), the decision maker behaves as if any probability that at least one expert deems
possible is indeed possible. And different sets Λ between these extremes allow for different
attitudes towards the uncertainty generated by the choice of the expert.
One attractive feature of the decision rule proposed here is the following. Assume that each
expert i uses the maxmin EU principle with a set of probabilities Ci as above. Given an act f ,
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expert i evaluates it by
Ji(f ) = min
p∈Ci
EUp(f ).
Suppose that the experts do not report their entire sets of beliefs Ci , but only their bottom-line
evaluation Ji(f ). Using the “truth metaphor”, the decision maker then faces uncertainty about
which expert is closest to the “truth”. As above, the decision maker may consider n epistemic
states of nature, where in state i expert i is right. Thus, if the decision maker knew which of
the experts had access to “truth”, she would follow that expert and evaluate f by Ji(f ). How-
ever, the decision maker does not know which expert has the correct assessment. Facing this
uncertainty, the decision maker might adopt the maxmin EU rule, with a set of probabilities
Λ ⊂ ({1, . . . , n}). The decision maker should therefore evaluate act f by
J0(f ) = min
λ∈Λ
n∑
i=1
λiJi(f ). (3)
It turns out that this evaluation coincides with the rule proposed above for the same set Λ.6
In other words, if the decision maker had access to the probabilities used by each expert, Ci ,
and were she to use the MEU rule relative to the set C0 given in (2), she would have arrived
at precisely the same conclusion as she would if she followed the rule (3) for the same set Λ.
Thus, the set of weight vectors over the experts, Λ, can be interpreted in two equivalent ways,
as in the Bayesian case: as a set of weights used to average the experts’ beliefs, and as a set of
probabilities over which expert is “right”. In particular, the decision maker can use the rule (3),
applying to the bottom-line evaluations of the experts, knowing that she would have arrived at
the same evaluation had she asked the experts for their entire sets of probabilities.
Gajdos and Vergnaud [15] also deal with the aggregation of expert opinions under uncertainty.
While their approach differs from ours in several significant ways (to be discussed below), they
also axiomatize a functional of the form (3).
The MEU model has been criticized for its inability to disentangle objective, given uncer-
tainty, which is presumably a feature of the decision problem at hand, from the subjective taste
for uncertainty, which is a trait of the decision maker. For example, if we observe a set C that
is a singleton, we cannot tell whether the decision maker has very precise information about the
problem, allowing her to formulate a Bayesian prior, or has a natural tendency to treat uncertain
situations as if they were risky. Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon and Vergnaud [14] explicitly model both
“hard” information and the set of priors that governs behavior, allowing for the latter to be a
proper subset of the former.7
In our context, we interpret the sets Ci of the experts as their objective information, ignoring
whatever attitudes towards uncertainty they may have. By contrast, the set Λ may reflect both
the decision maker’s information about the experts’ reliability and experience, and her attitude
towards uncertainty. Thus, it is possible that, given the same expert advice and the same infor-
mation about the experts, a certain decision maker will choose a larger set Λ than will another
decision maker, who is less averse to uncertainty.
6 This fact, which is rather straightforward, is formally stated and proved in the sequel.
7 Another approach to separate uncertainty from uncertainty attitudes is the “smooth” model [26,31,36], where the
decision maker is assumed to aggregate (in a non-linear way) various expected utility evaluations of an act rather than
focus on the minimal one.
Author's personal copy
2568 H. Crès et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 2563–2582
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first define the formal framework in
Section 2.1. The aggregation rule discussed above is formally stated in Section 2.2, where we
also state the equivalence between applying the MEU approach to the experts’ valuations and
applying it to the original problem, with the convex combinations of the experts’ probabilities.
We then turn to axiomatize this rule. To this end, we first explain the axiomatization informally in
Section 2.3. Finally, the main result is stated in Section 2.4 and proved in Appendix A. Section 3
concludes with a discussion of related literature.
2. Model and results
2.1. Set-up
We use a version of the Anscombe–Aumann [1] model as re-stated by Fishburn [12].
Let X be a set of outcomes. Let L denote the set of von Neumann–Morgenstern [38] lotteries,
that is, the distributions on X with finite support. L is endowed with a mixing operation: for
every P,Q ∈ L and every α ∈ [0,1], αP + (1 − α)Q ∈ L is given by
(
αP + (1 − α)Q)(x) = αP (x)+ (1 − α)Q(x).
The set of states of the world is S and it is endowed with a σ -algebra of events Σ . The set
of acts, F , consists of the Σ -measurable simple functions from S to L. It is endowed with a
mixture operation as well, performed pointwise. That is, for every f,g ∈ F and every α ∈ [0,1],
αf + (1 − α)g ∈ F is given by
(
αf + (1 − α)g)(s) = αf (s)+ (1 − α)g(s).
The decision maker (i = 0) and n experts (i = 1, . . . , n) have binary relations %i⊂ F × F ,
interpreted as preference relations. The relations i , ∼i are defined as usual, namely, as the
asymmetric and symmetric parts of %i , respectively.
We extend the relations (%i )i to L as usual. Thus, for P,Q ∈ L, P %i Q means fP %i fQ
where, for every R ∈ L, fR ∈ F is the constant act given by fR(s) = R for all s ∈ S. The set of
all constant acts is denoted Fc.
We assume that each of %i satisfies the axioms of GS [23]. We further assume that all (%i )i
agree on Fc , equivalently, on L. Thus, there exists an affine u : L → R that represents %i on L
for i = 0, . . . , n. Clearly, range(u) is a convex subset of R. We assume without loss of generality
(i) that u is not a constant; and (ii) that 0 is in the interior of range(u).
From GS [23] it follows that for each i = 0, . . . , n there exists a convex and weak∗-closed set
of finitely additive measures on (S,Σ), Ci , such that
f %i g iff Ji(f )> Ji(g)
where
Ji(f ) = Ju,Ci (f ) ≡ min
p∈Ci
∫
u(f )dp. (4)
Moreover, (u,Ci) are the unique pair that represents %i as in (4) (up to an increasing affine
transformation of u).
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2.2. The aggregation rule
We start by observing the following.
Proposition 1. For a convex and closed set Λ ⊆ ({1, . . . , n}),
J0(f ) = min
λ∈Λ
n∑
i=1
λiJi(f ) (5)
iff
C0 =
{
p =
n∑
i=1
λipi
∣∣∣ λ ∈ Λ, pi ∈ Ci
}
. (6)
Thus, when one proposes that the decision maker choose a convex and closed set of weights
Λ ⊂ ({1, . . . , n}), set
C0 =
{
p =
n∑
i=1
λipi
∣∣∣ λ ∈ Λ, pi ∈ Ci
}
and then define, as above,
J0(f ) = min
p∈C0
∫
u(f )dp,
one may equivalently propose that the decision maker employ the MEU approach on the experts’
valuations, using the same set of weights Λ ⊂ ({1, . . . , n}).
2.3. Motivating the axiomatization
In the Bayesian setting the averaging over the experts’ opinions follows from a unanimity
principle. As in Harsanyi’s [24] result, if all preference functionals are linear, then, under cer-
tain richness conditions, unanimity implies that the functional representing society’s preferences
is a linear combination of the functionals representing individuals’ preferences. But in a non-
Bayesian setting, this is no longer the case. Unanimity implies (i) that society’s functional can
be written as a function of the functionals of the individuals; and (ii) that this function is non-
decreasing. Assuming that all functionals are continuous, one may conclude that there exists a
continuous and non-decreasing function ϕ such that, for every act f ,
J0(f ) = ϕ
(
J1(f ), . . . , Jn(f )
) (7)
where ϕ is defined over the range of the Ji ’s.
To derive a representation as in (3), one needs to know more about the function ϕ. First, it has
to satisfy (1-)homogeneity and Shift whenever defined:
(i) ϕ is homogeneous if for a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈Rn, γ > 0,
ϕ(γ a) = γ ϕ(a);
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(ii) ϕ satisfies Shift if for a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈Rn, and c ∈R,
ϕ(a + −→c ) = ϕ(a)+ c
where −→c = (c, . . . , c) ∈Rn.
Second, ϕ has to be concave.
The fact that J0, J1, . . . , Jn are all MEU functionals implies that each of them satisfies the
corresponding properties, appropriately formulated for the space of acts. It turns out that this is
sufficient to determine that ϕ satisfies homogeneity and Shift. Intuitively, this is similar to arguing
that if ϕ maps linear functionals into a linear functional, ϕ itself has to be linear. However,
concavity does not have this property: even in the case n = 1 the fact that a functional J is
concave and that ϕ(J ) is concave does not imply that ϕ is concave.
One may, of course, stop here, and consider functionals as in (7) where ϕ need not be con-
cave, rather than insist on the MEU-style aggregation of the experts’ evaluations. However, the
following example illustrates why we find concavity of ϕ natural in this setting.
Let there be two states 1, 2 and two experts. Expert 1 believes that state 1 is at least as
likely as state 2, while expert 2 believes that state 2 is at least as likely as state 1. That is,
C1 = {p ∈ (S), s.t. p(1) > 12 }, and C2 = {p ∈ (S), s.t. p(1) 6 12 }. Set C0 = C1 ∩ C2: the
decision maker believes that both states are equally likely. As a consequence,
J0(f ) = max
(
J1(f ), J2(f )
)= max
λ∈({1,...,n})
{
λ1J1(f )+ λ2J2(f )
}
.
Clearly, unanimity holds, because max is a non-decreasing function. Moreover, the decision
maker has concave preferences, which happen to be linear in this case. However, we find the
decision maker’s confidence in the probability (0.5,0.5) poorly justified: each expert admits that
there is some uncertainty about the state of the world. The decision maker does not commit
to follow the advice of a single expert or to use a fixed averaging of their evaluations. Rather,
she behaves as if there is uncertainty about which expert is to be trusted – for some acts f ,
J0(f ) = J1(f ), for others, J0(f ) = J2(f ). And yet, miraculously, the uncertainty about the
experts “cancels out” the uncertainty about the state of the world, and the agent behaves in a
Bayesian way. There is nothing wrong about Bayesian beliefs when they are based on hard
evidence, but in this case the Bayesian beliefs result from an optimistic mix of the pessimistic
views of the experts.
We now seek an axiom that would rule out this type of aggregation. We wish to express the
intuition that the decision maker is averse to uncertainty at the level of the experts, and not only
at the level of the state of the world. We start with an example.
Assume that, for three acts, f , f1, f2, all experts agree that a 50%–50% average between the
evaluations (or certainty equivalents) of f1 and f2 cannot do better than f . That is, for every
i = 1, . . . , n
Ji(f )>
1
2
Ji(f1)+ 12Ji(f2).
It stands to reason that the decision maker would reach the same conclusion, namely that
J0(f )>
1
2
J0(f1)+ 12J0(f2).
Our main axiom will be a generalization of this condition. Before we state it explicitly, we explain
it in this simple case.
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To see why this axiom reflects uncertainty aversion, it may be useful to understand why we
do not require the same condition for the opposite inequality. Suppose, again, that there are two
experts and two states of the world. Expert i = 1,2 assigns probability 1 to state i. Assume that
fi yields a payoff of 1 in state i and 0 in the other state (3 − i). Thus,
J1(f1) = 1, J1(f2) = 0,
J2(f1) = 0, J2(f2) = 1.
By contrast, act f guarantees the payoff 0.5 in both states. Each of the two experts therefore
believes that a 50%–50% average between the evaluations of acts f1, f2 is just as good as act f :
1
2
Ji(f1)+ 12Ji(f2) = Ji(f ).
But the decision maker need not accept this conclusion. Clearly, f is evaluated by 0.5 also
by the decision maker, as the two experts agree on its evaluation. However, each act fi has a
worst case of 0 (if expert i happens to be wrong and expert 3 − i happens to get it right). Each
expert, using the same set of probabilities for the evaluation of f1 and of f2, finds the average
1
2Ji(f1)+ 12Ji(f2) sufficiently attractive because one of the two values {Ji(f1), Ji(f2)} is 1. But
the decision maker, not being sure which expert is right, takes into account the worst case for
each act separately. And then she finds that each of these acts has a worst case of zero, yielding
1
2
J0(f1)+ 12J0(f2) < J0(f ).
The difference of opinions between the experts can therefore reduce the average
1
2
J0(f1)+ 12J0(f2)
below each of the averages
1
2
Ji(f1)+ 12Ji(f2).
By contrast, consider again the condition we started with. Assume that for each expert we
have
Ji(f )>
1
2
Ji(f1)+ 12Ji(f2)
when we consider the evaluation by the decision maker, we follow the same reasoning as above:
the average of evaluations on the right-hand side can only be lower due to the fact that the
decision maker evaluates each act separately. Hence, a decision maker who is uncertainty averse
with respect to the experts should satisfy
J0(f )>
1
2
J0(f1)+ 12J0(f2).
Observe that the aversion of uncertainty at the level of the experts can also be interpreted as
aversion to the divergence of opinions across experts. This is closer to the intuition of Gajdos
and Vergnaud [15].
The condition as discussed above considers the averaging of the evaluations of only two acts
f1, f2 and compares them with a third act f . If the range of the vector function (J1(·), . . . , Jn(·))
is a convex subset of Rn, this condition will suffice to conclude that ϕ is concave. But if this
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range (which is the domain of ϕ) fails to be convex, the condition does not suffice for the derived
conclusion. Thus, we will require a stronger condition, involving any convex combination of
finitely many acts: if each expert evaluates an act f above the weighted average of the evaluations
of other acts f1, . . . , fm, so should the decision maker. We refer to this condition as Expert
Uncertainty Aversion (EUA), as it reflects the decision maker’s aversion to her uncertainty about
the expert who “has access to truth”.
Our main result states that axiom EUA is equivalent to the decision rule proposed above.
2.4. Main result
To state our main axiom, we introduce the following notation. For act f ∈ F and relation %i ,
c
f
i ∈ Fc is a%i -certainty equivalent of f , that is, a constant act such that f ∼i cfi . Such certainty
equivalents obviously exist, but they will typically not be unique. However, it is easy to see that
the validity of following condition is independent of the choice of these certainty equivalents.
Expert Uncertainty Aversion (EUA). For every acts f ∈ F , fk ∈ F , k = 1, . . . ,K , and every
numbers αk > 0 such that
∑
αk = 1, if
f %i
∑
k
αkc
fk
i for i = 1, . . . , n
then
f %0
∑
k
αkc
fk
0 .
Observe that, since cfki ∈ Fc for all i, k, their mixtures,
∑
k αkc
fk
i are also in Fc. Thus, EUA
states that, if each expert thinks that f is at least as desirable as a certain constant act, then the
decision maker also thinks that f is at least as desirable as a certain constant act. However, the
constant acts involved will typically vary across the different experts, as well as between them
and the decision maker. What relates the constant acts on the right-hand side is the fact that each
of them is obtained by the same mixture (αk) of certainty equivalents of the same acts (fk).
Since, however, for each expert and for the decision maker we have a distinct relation %i , these
certainty equivalents will typically vary.
It is easy to see that EUA is equivalent to the following condition: for every acts f ∈ F ,
fk ∈ F , k = 1, . . . ,K , and every numbers αk > 0 such that ∑αk = 1, if
Ji(f )>
∑
k
αkJi(fk) for i = 1, . . . , n
then
J0(f )>
∑
k
αkJ0(fk).
The EUA condition clearly implies a more standard condition, namely:
Unanimity. For every f,g ∈ F , if f %i g for all i = 1, . . . , n, then f %0 g.
Our main result is the following.
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Theorem 1. The following are equivalent:
(i) (%i )ni=0 satisfy EUA.
(ii) There is a convex and closed set Λ ⊆ ({1, . . . , n}) such that
J0(f ) = min
λ∈Λ
n∑
i=1
λiJi(f ).
Combining this result with the proposition above, we can state
Corollary 2. The following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) (%i )ni=0 satisfy EUA.
(ii) There is a convex and closed set Λ ⊆ ({1, . . . , n}) such that
J0(f ) = min
λ∈Λ
n∑
i=1
λiJi(f ).
(iii) There is a closed and convex set Λ ⊆ ({1, . . . , n}) such that
C0 =
{
p =
n∑
i=1
λipi
∣∣∣ λ ∈ Λ, pi ∈ Ci
}
.
The set Λ in (ii) or in (iii) is not unique in general. For instance, when all experts’ beliefs
coincide, condition (i) implies that J0 = Ji for each i = 1, . . . , n. Then the conclusion of either
(ii) or (iii) holds irrespective of the set Λ.
3. Discussion and related literature
In terms of motivation and content, this paper is close to Gajdos and Vergnaud [15]. As men-
tioned above, they also deal with the aggregation of beliefs of uncertainty averse experts, and
their suggested rule also takes the form suggested in (3). However, their model and axiomati-
zation differ from the present ones in several ways. First, Gajdos and Vergnaud [15] follow the
set-up of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon and Vergnaud [14] in allowing sets of probabilities to be a
component of the object of choice. Whereas Gajdos et al. [14] deal with a single decision maker,
who has a single set of probabilities, Gajdos and Vergnaud [15] deal with two experts and with
two sets of probabilities, one for each expert. Thus, the decision maker has preferences over
triples of the form (f,P,Q) where f is an act, P is the set of probabilities of the first expert,
and Q – of the second. In this set-up, Gajdos and Vergnaud derive the same aggregation rule for
two experts who are treated symmetrically (resulting in a set Λ that is an interval in [0,1] with
a midpoint at 1/2).8 They also provide a definition and characterization of the relation “decision
maker 1 is more averse to conflict (between experts’ opinions) than decision maker 2”.
A related strand in the literature has to do with “judgment aggregation”. This title refers to
the aggregation of binary opinions, to be viewed as truth functions over a set of propositions.
Starting with an equivalent of the Condorcet paradox, List and Pettit [28] derive an Arrow-style
8 The two papers were independently developed.
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impossibility theorem. Many further impossibility results were derived since.9 Our approach
differs from the judgment aggregation approach in that (i) we assume that beliefs are modeled as
probabilities, or sets thereof, rather than as truth functions; and (ii) by considering the average
as a basic aggregation procedure, we do not follow an “independence” axiom that is common in
this literature and that is essential for the impossibility results.10
Chambers and Echenique [7] also study the aggregation of uncertainty averse preferences.
In their case, however, the objects of choice are allocations of an aggregate bundle among the
members of a household, so that the problem involves the aggregation of preferences and not
only of beliefs.
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
We first assume that (6) holds and prove (5). Let there be given f ∈ F . Choose λf ∈ Λ to
minimize
∑n
i=1 λiJi(f ), and choose p
f
i ∈ Ci for i = 1, . . . , n such that Ji(f ) =
∫
u(f )dp
f
i .
Clearly, pf0 ≡
∑n
i=1 λ
f
i p
f
i ∈ C0. Hence
J0(f )6
∫
u(f )dp
f
0 =
n∑
i=1
λ
f
i
∫
u(f )dp
f
i = min
λ∈Λ
n∑
i=1
λiJi(f ).
To see the converse inequality, let pf0 ∈ C0 be such that
J0(f ) =
∫
u(f )dp
f
0 .
By (6), there exist pfi ∈ Ci for i > 1, and λf ∈ Λ, such that pf0 ≡
∑n
i=1 λ
f
i p
f
i . Hence
n∑
i=1
λ
f
i Ji(f )6
n∑
i=1
λ
f
i
∫
u(f )dp
f
i =
∫
u(f )dp
f
0 = J0(f ).
Next assume that (5) holds. Define a set of measures Cˆ0 = {p =∑ni=1 λipi | pi ∈ Ci, λ ∈ Λ}
and a corresponding functional Jˆ , namely
Jˆ (f ) := min
p∈Cˆ0
∫
u(f )dp.
The first part of the proof ((6) implies (5)) can be invoked to verify that Jˆ (f ) =
minλ∈Λ
∑n
i=1 λiJi(f ) for all f ∈ F . Hence Jˆ = J0. Uniqueness of the maxmin representation
then implies Cˆ0 = C0.
9 See a forthcoming Symposium in the Journal of Economic Theory.
10 In the absence of probabilities one may still use averaging, say, of relative rankings. However, this type of aggregation
of opinions would violate independence-like axioms, much as Borda’s rule for the aggregation of preferences violates
Arrow’s independence axiom.
Another non-probabilistic approach to uncertainty aversion has been suggested by Bossert [5] and Bossert and
Slinko [6].
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A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
The fact that (ii) implies (i) is immediate. We therefore turn to the converse direction, namely,
that (i) implies (ii).
We denote by B = B(J ) the range of the vector J = (J1, . . . , Jn) of the experts’ evaluations
and assume, without loss of generality, that u assumes the value zero. It is an immediate conse-
quence of Unanimity that, for a given act f , J0(f ) is only a function of J (f ). We state this fact
as a lemma.
Lemma 1. There is a function φ : B → R such that, for each f ∈ F ,
J0(f ) = φ
(
J (f )
)
.
Proof. Indeed, let f,g ∈ F be two acts such that J (f ) = J (g). By Unanimity, and since f ∼i g
for each i, one has both f %0 g and g %0 f . 
The proof of the implication (i) ⇒ (ii) is organized along the following steps.
We prove first that φ is monotone (non-decreasing), homogeneous and satisfies Shift whenever
defined.11 We then perform three extensions of φ to supersets of B . First, we consider the positive
cone spanned by B , cone(B), extend φ to this positive cone by homogeneity, and prove that it
retains the three properties (monotonicity, homogeneity, and Shift). Second, we consider the
convex hull of cone(B), to be denoted by D. We show that D is a convex cone invariant under
translation along the unit vector. We extend φ to a concave function ψ on D, using axiom EUA.
We then continue to prove that ψ retains monotonicity, homogeneity, and Shift on D. Finally,
we further extend ψ from D to all of Rn, retaining monotonicity, concavity, homogeneity, and
Shift. Finally, we apply the logic of the proof of GS [23] to show that there is a closed set
Λ ⊆ ({1, . . . , n}) such that, for all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈Rn,
ψ(x1, . . . , xn) = min
λ∈Λ
n∑
i=1
λixi .
Lemma 2. For b ∈ B and 0 < α < 1, we have αb ∈ B . The map φ is monotone and homogeneous
on B .
Proof. We start with monotonicity. Let a, b ∈ B be given, such that a 6 b. Let f and g be
two acts such that J (f ) = a and J (g) = b. It follows from Unanimity that J0(f )6 J0(g). This
implies that φ is monotone.
Let now b ∈ B and 0 < α 6 1 be given. We wish to prove that αb ∈ B and that φ(αb) =
αφ(b). Let g be an act such that J (g) = b, let z ∈ L be such that u(z) = 0, and define an act f by
f = αg+ (1 −α)fz, where fz is the constant act that yields z in each state. Since u is affine, one
has u(f (s)) = αu(g(s)), for each state s. It follows from the functional forms of J0, J1, . . . , Jn
that J0(f ) = αJ0(g) and that Ji(f ) = αJi(g) for each expert i. This means that αb = J (f ) ∈ B .
11 Throughout the proof, “monotonicity” refers to weak monotonicity, that is, to the function being non-decreasing.
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Furthermore,
φ(αb) = φ(J (f ))= J0(f ) = αJ0(g) = αφ(J (g))= αφ(b),
as desired. 
We let cone(B) stand for the cone spanned by B , and still denote by φ the extension of φ (by
homogeneity) to the set cone(B).
Lemma 3. The extension of the map φ to cone(B) is monotone and homogeneous.
Proof. Homogeneity is immediate from the definition. To see that monotonicity holds, as-
sume that a, b ∈ B are such that, for some α,β > 0, αa 6 βb. In light of Lemma 2, there
is no loss of generality in assuming that β > 1. Consider the point d = α
β
a and observe that
d 6 b. Choose γ > 0 such that γ < min(1, β
α
). Thus, γ d, γ b ∈ B . We also have γ d 6 γ b, and
thus φ(γ d) 6 φ(γ b) by monotonicity of φ on B . Homogeneity then yields φ(d) 6 φ(b) and
φ(αa)6 φ(βb). 
Next we wish to show that φ satisfies Shift, and that cone(B) is closed under shifts. More
explicitly:
Lemma 4. For all c ∈R,
• c + cone(B) ⊆ cone(B).
• For all x ∈ cone(B), one has φ(x + c) = φ(x)+ c.
Proof. We prove the two statements together. Let x ∈ cone(B), and c ∈ R. We will prove that
x+ c ∈ cone(B), and that φ(x+ c) = φ(x)+ c. By homogeneity, we may assume without loss of
generality that 2x ∈ B and that 2c is in the range of u. Let f ∈ F be an act such that J (f ) = 2x,
and let z ∈ L be such that u(z) = 2c. Let h ∈ F be the act defined by h = 12f + 12fz. Since u is
affine, and using the functional form of the Ji ’s, one has
Ji(h) = 12Ji(f )+ c, (8)
for all experts, i = 1, . . . , n, as well as for the decision maker, i = 0.
Applying (8) to all experts yields J (h) = 12J (f )+ c = x + c. In particular, x + c ∈ cone(B),
and φ(x + c) = φ(J (h)) = J0(h). On the other hand, and when applying (8) to the decision
maker, one gets
J0(h) = 12J0(f )+ c =
1
2
φ
(
J (f )
)+ c = 1
2
φ(2x)+ c = φ(x)+ c,
where the last equality holds since φ is homogeneous. Combining both equalities yields φ(x +
c) = φ(x)+ c. 
We now come to the main part of the proof, which is the extension of φ to a convex domain,
so that it be concave on it. To highlight this step, we change the notation of the domain (to D)
and the function (to ψ ).
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Let, then, D stand for the convex hull of the cone(B). Define ψ : D → R as follows. For
x ∈ D, we set ψ(x) := sup∑k αkφ(xk), where the supremum is taken over all finite families
xk ∈ cone(B),αk > 0 (k = 1, . . . ,K), such that ∑k αk = 1 and x >∑k αkxk . The following
lemma shows, by standard arguments, that ψ is monotone and concave, and, using the EUA
axiom, that φ coincides with ψ wherever (φ is) defined. Observe that if φ were already known
to be defined on a convex domain, one could use EUA directly to prove that φ is concave.
Lemma 5. The map ψ coincides with φ on cone(B), and it is monotone and concave on D.
Proof. We start with the first statement. Observe first that for every x ∈ cone(B), there exists
η∗ ∈ (0,1], such that η∗x ∈ B . Then, as Lemma 2 states, ηx ∈ B , for every η ∈ (0, η∗].
Let x ∈ cone(B) be given. Clearly, ψ(x) > φ(x). We now prove that φ(x) > ψ(x). Let a
finite family xk ∈ cone(B), αk > 0 (k = 1, . . . ,K) be given, with ∑k αk = 1 and x >∑k αkxk .
There is η > 0 small enough such that ηx ∈ B , and ηxk ∈ B , for each k. Let f,fk ∈ K be acts
such that J (f ) = ηx and J (fk) = ηxk for each k. Since x >∑k αkxk , and using EUA, one has
J0(f ) >
∑
k αkJ0(fk), that is, φ(ηx) >
∑
k αkφ(ηxk). By homogeneity, φ(x) >
∑
k αkφ(xk).
Since the family (xk,αk) is arbitrary, the inequality φ(x)>ψ(x) follows, as desired.
To see that ψ is monotone, assume that x ′ > x. Then the set of points and weights {(xk), (αk)}
used in the definition of ψ(x′) is a superset of the corresponding set for ψ(x), and the supremum
over the former can only be larger than the supremum over the latter.
We now prove that ψ is concave. Let x, x′ ∈ D be given. We will prove that ψ( 12x + 12x′)6
1
2ψ(x) + 12ψ(x′). Let two finite families xk ∈ B,αk > 0 (k = 1, . . . ,K) and x′l ∈ B,α′l > 0 (l =
K + 1, . . . ,K ′) be given, with ∑k αk = ∑l α′l = 1, x >∑k αkxk and x′ >∑l α′lx′l . Consider
the finite family x˜k ∈ B , α˜k > 0, k = 1, . . . ,K ′, where x˜k = xk if k 6K , and x˜k = x′k if k > K ,
while α˜k = 12αk if k 6K , and α˜k = 12α′k if k >K .
Plainly,
1
2
x + 1
2
x′ >
∑
k
α˜kx˜k,
hence
ψ
(
1
2
x + 1
2
x′
)
>
∑
k
α˜kφ(x˜k) = 12
K∑
k=1
αkφ(xk)+ 12
K ′∑
l=K+1
α′lφ
(
x′l
)
.
Taking the supremum over families xk , αk , x′l , α′l then yields
ψ
(
1
2
x + 1
2
x′
)
> 1
2
ψ(x)+ 1
2
ψ
(
x′
)
,
as desired. 
The proof of the next lemma is routine, and is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 6. The map ψ is homogeneous, and satisfies Shift.
We now have a convex cone D containing the diagonal, and a function ψ on it that is mono-
tone, concave, homogeneous and satisfies Shift. The set D is a superset of B , and ψ is an
extension of φ. Thus, a minimum-average representation of ψ will serve as a minimum-average
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representation of φ. To obtain such a representation, we wish to know that D is of full dimension-
ality. Since this is not guaranteed to be the case, we further extend the domain and the function.
Lemma 7. The function ψ can be extended toRn retaining monotonicity, concavity, homogeneity,
and Shift.
Proof. Extend ψ to Rn by defining
ψ ′(y) = sup
x∈D,x6y
ψ(x).
To see that ψ ′ is well defined, consider y ∈Rn. Denote
y∗ = max
i6n
yi,
y∗ = min
i6n
yi
and observe that −→y∗ 6 y 6
−→
y∗. Because −→y∗ ∈ D, the set {x ∈ D|x 6 y} is non-empty and ψ ′(y)>
ψ(−→y∗) = y∗. On the other hand, any x ∈ D that satisfies x 6 y also satisfies x 6 −→y∗, where −→y∗ ∈ D
and ψ(
−→
y∗) = y∗. Hence (by monotonicity of ψ on D) any such x satisfies ψ(x)6 ψ(−→y∗) = y∗.
This means that ψ ′(y) is well defined and that it satisfies y∗ 6ψ ′(y)6 y∗.
Next, since ψ is known to be non-decreasing on D, ψ ′(y) = ψ(y) for y ∈ D. Hence ψ ′ is an
extension of ψ , and for simplicity we will denote it also by ψ .
We claim that ψ continues to satisfy the following properties on all of Rn: (i) monotonicity;
(ii) concavity; (iii) homogeneity; (iv) Shift. See Appendix B for details. 
We finally repeat the GS argument.
Lemma 8. There is a closed and convex set Λ ⊆ ({1, . . . , n}) such that, for all x ∈Rn,
ψ(x) = min
λ∈Λ
n∑
i=1
λixi .
Proof. Consider x∗ ∈ Rn. Using a supporting hyperplane theorem, there is (q∗, γ ∗) ∈ Rn × R
such that〈
q∗, x
〉+ γ ∗ >ψ(x), ∀x ∈Rn,〈
q∗, x∗
〉+ γ ∗ = ψ(x∗).
Monotonicity implies that q > 0, for if qi < 0 for some i 6 n, we get ψ(x∗ + ei) < ψ(x∗)
where ei is the i-th unit vector, contradicting monotonicity.
Next, set c = ψ(x∗) and observe that ψ is constant along the line{
αx∗ + (1 − α)−→c ∣∣ α ∈R}.
We conclude that 〈q∗, x〉 also has to be constant along this line. And this implies that 〈q∗,−→c 〉 = c
and q∗ is a probability vector in ({1, . . . , n}). Finally, homogeneity implies that γ ∗ = 0.
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Thus, for x∗ ∈Rn we have established the existence of q∗ ∈ ({1, . . . , n}) such that〈
q∗, x
〉
>ψ(x), ∀x ∈Rn,〈
q∗, x∗
〉= ψ(x∗). (9)
Finally, we define
Λ := clco({q∗ ∣∣ x∗ ∈Rn})
to be the closed convex hull of the corresponding set of vectors q∗, and we observe that, for every
x ∈Rn,
ψ(x) = min
λ∈Λ
n∑
i=1
λixi . 
In particular, φ(x) = minλ∈Λ∑ni=1 λixi for all x ∈ B . This concludes the proof of (ii).
Appendix B. Proof details
B.1. Proof of Lemma 6
We define ψ by ψ(x) := sup∑k αkφ(xk), where the supremum is taken over all finite families
xk ∈ cone(B), αk > 0 (k = 1, . . . ,K), such that ∑k αk = 1 and x >∑k αkxk .
Homogeneity: Let there be given x and β > 0. Since β may be larger or smaller than 1, it
suffices to show that
ψ(βx)> βψ(x).
Let there be given xk ∈ cone(B), αk > 0 (k = 1, . . . ,K), such that ∑k αk = 1 and x >∑k αkxk .
Define x′k = βxk ∈ cone(B). Then
βx >
∑
k
αkβxk =
∑
k
αkx
′
k
and it follows that
ψ(βx)>
∑
k
αkφ
(
x′k
)=∑
k
αkφ(βxk) = β
∑
k
αkφ(xk).
As this holds for any pair of sequences {xk}, {αk}, and ψ(x) is the supremum over the respective∑
k αkφ(xk), the conclusion follows.
Shift: Let there be given x and c ∈R. Since c may be positive or negative, it suffices to show
that
ψ(x + −→c )>ψ(x)+ c.
Consider xk ∈ cone(B), αk > 0 (k = 1, . . . ,K), such that ∑k αk = 1 and x >∑k αkxk . De-
fine x′k = xk + −→c ∈ cone(B). Observe that
x + −→c >
∑
k
αkx
′
k =
∑
k
αk(xk + −→c )
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hence
ψ(x + −→c )>
∑
k
αkφ(xk + c) =
∑
k
αkφ(xk)+ c.
As this holds for any pair of sequences {xk}, {αk}, and ψ(x) is the supremum over the respective∑
k αkφ(xk), the conclusion follows.
B.2. Details of proof of Lemma 7
We show that ψ satisfies monotonicity, concavity, homogeneity and Shift:
Monotonicity: Consider y, z ∈ Rn such that y > z. Then any x ∈ D such that x 6 z also
satisfies x 6 y and it follows that ψ(y)>ψ(z).
Concavity: Let y, z ∈Rn and α ∈ [0,1]. We wish to show that
ψ
(
αy + (1 − α)z)> αψ(y)+ (1 − α)ψ(z).
For ε > 0, let xy, xz ∈ D be such that y > xy , z> xz and
ψ(y) < ψ(xy)+ ε,
ψ(z) < ψ(xz)+ ε.
This means that
αψ(y)+ (1 − α)ψ(z) < αψ(xy)+ (1 − α)ψ(xz)+ ε.
Since D is convex, αxy + (1 − α)xz ∈ D. Because ψ is concave on D,
ψ
(
αxy + (1 − α)xz
)
> αψ(xy)+ (1 − α)ψ(xz)
and thus
ψ
(
αxy + (1 − α)xz
)
> αψ(y)+ (1 − α)ψ(z)− ε.
Next, observe that y > xy , z> xz imply
αy > αxy,
(1 − α)z> (1 − α)xz
and
αy + (1 − α)z> αxy + (1 − α)xz.
By definition of ψ ,
ψ
(
αy + (1 − α)z)>ψ(αxy + (1 − α)xz)
and thus
ψ
(
αy + (1 − α)z)> αψ(y)+ (1 − α)ψ(z)− ε
for all ε > 0, which means that ψ is concave.
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Homogeneity: Consider y ∈Rn and α > 0. We wish to show that
ψ(αy) = αψ(y).
It suffices to show
ψ(αy)> αψ(y)
(because α can be larger or smaller than 1). Consider, then, ε > 0 and xy ∈ D such that y > xy
and
ψ(y) < ψ(xy)+ ε.
Since ψ is homogeneous on D,
ψ(αxy) = αψ(xy).
Moreover,
αy > αxy
and thus
ψ(αy)>ψ(αxy) = αψ(xy) > αψ(y)− αε.
This being true for all ε > 0, we conclude that ψ(αy)> αψ(y).
Shift: Let there be given y ∈Rn and c ∈R. We wish to show that
ψ(y + −→c ) = ψ(y)+ c.
It suffices to show that (for all y ∈Rn and c ∈R)
ψ(y + −→c )>ψ(y)+ c
observe that, for every x ∈ D such that x 6 y, we have x + −→c ∈ D and x + −→c 6 y + −→c . Thus,
ψ(y + −→c )>ψ(x + −→c ) = ψ(x)+ c
where the last equality follows from the fact that ψ satisfies Shift on D. Taking the supremum
on the right-hand side, we obtain the conclusion that ψ(y + −→c )>ψ(y)+ c.
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